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c u r r i c u l u m . "If by 1980, the number of courses and pro-
grams has doubled or t r i p l e d , " she wrote i n 1974, " a n d if 
i n freshman E n g l i s h the students are st i l l reading male 
writers o n male lives, and i n U n i t e d States history the 
students are st i l l s tudying male-culture heroes, wars and 
male po l i t i ca l documents, then we shall have failed our 
miss ion , or at least not yet succeeded." She parts company 
w i t h those feminists such as Bowles and K l e i n (Glor ia 
Bowles and Renate D u e l l i K l e i n . Theories of Women's 
Studies. L o n d o n : Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1983) who 
argue for autonomous women's studies programs. She 
agrees w i t h them, however, that it is impossible i n most 
areas of knowledge to s imply add women to the curr icu-
l u m . Her vision is of a new c u r r i c u l u m that goes beyond 
both the male c u r r i c u l u m and women's studies as we 
k n o w them today. Educat ion w o u l d become truly "coedu-
ca t iona l . " 
As H o w e makes clear, her o w n activities i n higher edu-
cation as wel l as the progress of women's studies itself have 
been, at least i n part, the result of tokenism. Even i n 1983, 
when she was invited to give the o p e n i n g lecture at the 
University of Wisconsin for a centennial celebration of the 
teaching of American literature, she was a "token w o m a n . " 
Such an experience was not unusual for H o w e . F r o m 
being a Jewish c h i l d i n a Protestant culture, to being a 
working-class g i r l i n middle-class schools, she has not 
been unaccustomed to being marginal ized. In 1969, she 
became the first chairperson of the C o m m i s s i o n o n the 
Status of W o m e n set u p by the Modern Language Associa-
t ion, and i n 1971, her office became the clearinghouse on 
women's studies syl labi . H o w e was also responsible for 
establishing the Feminist Press that was so instrumental 
i n recovering the legacy of w r i t i n g by black and white 
women i n the Uni ted States. Currently, she is president of 
the Feminist Press and Professor of A m e r i c a n Studies at 
the State University of New York, College at O l d Westbury. 
Howe's personal and intellectual commentaries on the 
relat ionship of education to an Amer ican culture that is 
racist, patriarchal and elitist a l lows us to appreciate more 
ful ly the founding and development of women's studies 
o n N o r t h Amer ican campuses. By her teaching and activ-
i sm, she helped to create what we understand today by 
women's studies. 
We can be grateful for the courage, creativity, and pas-
sionate commitment that Florence H o w e has devoted to 
the development of women's studies. We are fortunate to 
be able to share i n this book her struggles, achievements, 
and visions. That she has been so successful may help to 
expla in , however, why the impact of this book is l imited. 
T h e book is a pleasure to read, but it has little new to offer. 
T h e repetition i n several essays of the same fragments of 
themes, arguments, i l lustrations, and personal accounts 
even becomes irr i tat ing. She provides some useful ideas 
regarding changes i n pedagogy and curr i cu lum. She does 
not address some of the more diff icult and pressing ques-
tions that demand attention. H o w is women's studies 
related to other strategies for the liberation of women? 
H o w can women's studies acquire a posit ion in academe 
beyond that of tokenism? What ideas has feminist scholar-
ship produced so far that could possibly lead to the trans-
formation of the curr i cu lum and make it truly coedu-
cational? 
T o end this review o n that note w o u l d be churl ish . 
Howe's book remind us of how m u c h has been accomp-
lished, how diff icult the struggle is, how important it is for 
women to read about other women's lives and struggles i n 
order to understand their o w n experiences, and how m u c h 
more is yet to be done. 
Arlene T i g a r M c L a r e n 
S i m o n Fraser University 
Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist 
Research. L i z Stanley and Sue Wise. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1983, Pp. 202.. 
Breaking Out is at once the most radical and the most 
intuit ively va l id piece of feminist w r i t i n g I have come 
upon i n the past decade. Why? Because it fits w i t h , and 
make analytic sense of, my personal experience. L i k e the 
authors, I, too, have felt discomfited by and increasingly 
distant from the kinds of feminist ideas w h i c h tell me 
" h o w it i s " and that I "have it w r o n g " if I articulate a lack 
of fit between my o w n life experience and the given cate-
gories of "feminist social izat ion" and " w o m a n as v i c t i m . " 
T h o u g h dissimilar on the surface, these various typolo-
gies of feminist theory (e.g., socialist-feminism, Marxist-
feminism, even so-called liberal feminism) share c o m m o n 
and quite conventional assumptions about social reality. 
What Stanley and Wise cal l "feminist or thodoxy" refers to 
a deterministic explanation of how women are oppressed 
by social structures and social systems (whether conceptu-
alized as patriarchy, capital ism, or some amalgam of the 
two system), and they argue that such explanations oper-
ate w i t h i n the paradigm of post ivism, the essence of con-
ventional social science. 
T h e m a i n intellectual task of this book is the repudia-
t ion of posi t ivism, w h i c h claims that there is a knowable 
social reality "out there" beyond the subjective experience 
and interpretation of indiv iduals . Positivistic social 
research assumes that w i t h adequate theory and scientific 
methodology the researcher can uncover the "objective 
t r u t h " about social phenomena. T h e writers argue that 
this model is eminently unsuitable for t h i n k i n g about 
social reality. Certainly feminist have already heavily cri -
t iqued " n o r m a l social science" for its inherent masculinist 
biases w h i c h , pr ior to feminist scrutiny, was passed of as 
n o t h i n g less than "objective real i ty ." Stanley and Wise go 
m u c h further than asking that women be added i n or even 
that the models be reconstituted to incorporate women's as 
well as men's experiences. They reject grand theories on 
the ontological grounds that what is knowable cannot be 
separated from the knower, i.e., from subjective expe-
rience. G r a n d theories are abstracted from the l ived expe-
rience through w h i c h individuals construct social reality, 
and they postulate casual, therefore deterministic rela-
tionships. 
Determinism, whether of the left or right i n terms of 
conventional (male-constructed) politics, assumes that 
people's thoughts, feelings, attitudes and behaviour are 
caused by specific condit ions or structures out there. Peo-
ple are not understood to be actively creating, choosing or 
negotiating their situation; predictable things happen to 
them. Feminist theory, so radical and path-breaking in its 
exposure of, and challenge to, masculinist bias, has been 
decidedly traditional i n adopt ing the deterministic as-
sumptions and methodology of normal social science. 
There has been, according to the writers, n o real discus-
sion w i t h i n feminism of the troublesome inherent contra-
dictions. O n the one hand, deterministic biological psy-
chological and social theories w h i c h have explained and 
buttressed male dominance are rejected. O n the other 
hand, there is acceptance of a "feminist determinism," 
w h i c h portrays women as passive victims of social condi-
t ioning and family-based oppression, which serves the 
requirements of the capitalist and/or patriarchial system. 
Stanley and Wise criticize these theoretical assumptions 
as at once overly-socialized because they depict the female 
c h i l d as passive, totally malleable, and entirely determined 
by society; and psychologistic because the theories suggest 
that there exists w i t h i n the c h i l d certain innate traits. T h e 
socialization model , w h i c h has been central to feminist 
theorizing about oppression, is also said to be reificatory 
i n its abstracted portrayal of the demands of the family and 
the social system. T h e i r f inal crit icism is of the model's 
nonreflexiveness: it cannot expla in feminism! Somehow, 
i n a way never explicated by feminist writ ings, feminists 
w o u l d have to be special and outside the determined order 
of things i n order to have escaped the fate held to be 
unavoidable for women i n general. 
Stanley and Wise assert two alternative theoretical ideas 
w h i c h form the basis of their o w n posi t ion in this book. 
T h e i r first c l a i m is that the personal is centrally involved 
i n the product ion and evaluation of ideas; the second, a 
corollary, is that the personal is equal ly impl icated i n 
oppression: "Institutions, structures do not oppress. Peo-
ple oppress people—they make decisions to do so, and the 
oppressed sometimes comply i n acts of oppress ion" (p. 
82). 
Breaking Out is a book about the theoretical and practi-
cal val idat ion of personal experience—not to get to the 
reality beyond, a la naturalism i n social science, but pre-
cisely because there is noth ing beyond the personal. " T o 
talk about ' g o i n g beyond' is to posit a false dis t inct ion 
between experience and theory and between structure and 
process" (p. 83). T h e revolution w h i c h feminists require if 
we are to break out of our oppression is not a major event 
out there, but rather many little revolutions i n our dai ly 
lives. F e m i n i s m is not what you preach but what you live. 
S i m i l a r l y , sexism is not a disembodied system out there, 
but is at its root "a set of practices, contextually located 
and dai ly enacted, w h i c h f ix us w i t h i n t h e m " (p. 183). In 
other words, positivistic and deterministic accounts of our 
situation as women deny the primacy of our personal 
experience and interpretation of reality, ignore our active 
part ic ipat ion i n the contexts i n w h i c h we operate, and 
m i n i m i z e our capacity to make subjectively meaningful 
choices about our lives. 
Nowhere are these tendencies more ful ly evident, i n the 
authors' view, than i n Marxist-feminist theory. They 
reject M a r x i s m as an essentially masculinist grand theory 
concerned w i t h abstract debates disconnected from every-
day experience. Marxist - feminism tries to fit women into a 
masculinist w o r l d view i n w h i c h the personal gets lost i n a 
realm of ideas and structures. T h e separation of theory 
from experience is an inevitable result of b u i l d i n g grand 
theories w h i c h rest o n generalizations, cannot do more 
than approximate reality, and centrally assume a deter-
mined social reality. 
Feminist consciousness constitutes a particular and 
unique way of g o i n g about m a k i n g sense of the w o r l d . It 
arises i n the first instance from the fact of being female and 
being treated as female (males cannot possess feminist 
consciousness). Such consciousness needs to be under-
stood as both process and state, says the authors, "because 
differently situated and changing understandings under-
p i n any 'state' of consciousness" (p. 123). T h i s leads them 
to the pos i t ion that there is no one true feminist con-
sciousness but rather a mul t ip l ic i ty of feminist construc-
tions of "differently situated and contextually grounded 
experiences" (p. 123). 
What does a l l this mean for d o i n g feminist research? 
First and foremost, a feminist researcher should not dis-
tance herself f rom other w o m e n i n order to make them the 
objects of her objective research. She should not treat 
objective reality and subjective experience as two separate 
entities because this process inherently invalidates women's 
experiences and is thereby oppressive. 
There is a cont inual contradiction between women's 
involvement i n everyday experience and the " l a n -
guage of theory." T h e language of theory exerts a 
conceptual imper ia l i sm over experience...and one 
consequence is that women are not only alienated 
from theory but also experience itself (p. 163). 
Instead, our starting point must be an exploration of the 
social construction of our everyday lives. T h e authors 
believe that feminism does not adequately understand 
h o w and why w o m e n are oppressed; u n t i l we do possess 
this knowledge we cannot c l a i m that we know how to 
liberate ourselves. 
T h e i r discussion provides three main principles for 
d o i n g feminist research; (1) the analytic use of feeling and 
experience to examine the personal should be the basis of 
feminist research; (2) the researcher should be expl ic i t ly 
situated i n any research she undertakes, m a k i n g her direct 
experience of the research process an explic i t part of her 
social science work; (3) verbal and written language is 
h i g h l y important to the goal of l iberation (a realization 
greatly inf luenced by the authors' reading of Mary Daly's 
work) : " to break out of our ways of th ink ing , w r i t i n g and 
speaking is, i n effect to break out of how we presently live 
i n a l l of its inf ini te aspects" (p. 186). 
In this regard, the way i n w h i c h Breaking Out is written 
is n o less important than what it has to say. T h e authors' 
subjectivity is always present and accounted for; they 
move easily and natural ly between the personal and the 
general, always showing the l inks between what they 
k n o w and how they came to know it for themselves, mak-
i n g part icularly relevant use of their experience w i t h the 
theory and practice of gay poli t ics as data. 
T h e i r route to feminist understanding has already been 
marked out by those phi losophica l and social science 
schools k n o w n as phenomenology, social construction 
of reality, interactionism and ethnomethodology, a l l of 
w h i c h believe that people subjectively construct, interpret 
and negotiate social reality, though we almost always 
behave as if there was an objective reality. T h e authors 
acknowledge these influences, particularly that of eth-
nomethodology w h i c h they f ind "interesting and usefu l " 
because it "takes the everyday and the personal as both a 
topic of its research and also the source w i t h w h i c h it 
works" (p. 138). 
D o Stanley and Wise take the extreme subjectivist posi-
t ion that there is noth ing out there beyond the contents of 
our heads? As feminist they start f rom the incontrovertible 
awareness that women are oppressed; but they argue, i n 
sharp contrast to feminist orthodoxy, that we are people 
w h o get oppressed by other people i n myr iad daily ways, 
and we actively define, interpret and participate i n this 
process. We can change it only through our daily actions 
and choices. Structures are seen as c r u m b l i n g or fading 
away at the point when people behave differently (or make 
different interpretations of reality) in grounded situations. 
A recent personal experience is relevant. A t a feminist 
workshop a presenter was arguing that only a structural 
revolution could br ing to an end the injustice of w o r k i n g 
women's double day. F r o m the floor, I offered the view 
that i n d i v i d u a l women could change their double day by 
refusing to put u p wi th it. I, for one, had never accepted to 
live wi th a man w h o w o u l d not do his share of domestic 
work. T h e presenter then suggested that perhaps for a few 
professional women like myself there might be a personal 
solution, but for w o r k i n g women i n general, personal 
solutions were not possible, only structural ones. She d i d 
not expla in why she thought this was so, but she d i d 
clearly attempt to invalidate my personal reality (which 
includes the experience of being free not to accept a man's 
behaviour if it is objectionable). 
It is this fundamental change to feminist orthodoxy 
w h i c h w i l l l ikely disturb many readers of this book (or 
even this review). In assuming and arguing that w o m e n — 
like men—have the freedom to make choices, Stanley and 
Wise are c l a i m i n g that we also bear responsibility as i n d i -
viduals for the choices we do make and the realities thus 
constructed i n our daily lives. Where many voices w i l l 
l ikely clamor that this posi t ion is a blatant instance of 
b l a m i n g the v ic t im, the authors try to show that it is, 
rather, a truly feminist pos i t ion and that the woman-as-
vict im assumption is really antifeminist i n its i m p l i c a -
tions. 
Speaking for myself, the phi losophica l and empir ical 
arguments of Breaking Out are logical and va l id . I had 
already decided that I w o u l d only do research on topics 
w h i c h were relevant to my direct experience and/or per-
sonally important, and that my methods w o u l d be interac-
tive and engaged. After reading this book, I am m u c h 
better able to articulate why this is the only research 
approach w i t h w h i c h I feel comfortable. T h i s work also 
represents for me the cognitive bridge between my con-
sciousness as a feminist and my understanding of i n d i v i d -
ual psychology. As a feminist I habitual ly identify, cr i -
tique and challenge assumptions and practices of male 
dominance w h i c h I personally experience as objectiona-
ble. As a psychotherapist w o r k i n g w i t h women, I identify, 
cri t ique and challenge a l l i n d i v i d u a l assumptions and 
practices w h i c h women use to impede their o w n attain-
ment of personal autonomy. It is clear to me that the 
i n d i v i d u a l must, and can, free herself from internally held 
constraints (regardless of where they originate) w h i c h typ-
ical ly exert far more cruel l imits on her potential than do 
any external, societal barriers. In h e l p i n g women move 
through this process, I predictably encounter in i t ia l anger 
and resistance. Stanley and Wise provide an explanation 
w h i c h concurs w i t h my o w n : 
structural explanations...enable people to hide i n 
collectivisms, i n the sense that they can avoid taking 
responsibil ity for their o w n lives and actions, (p. 
107) 
Breaking Out offers to any woman w h o cares to hear the 
message a vision of how to break out from oppression in 
her o w n daily life wi thout w a i t i n g for something to 
change externally. For the feminist researcher there is 
m u c h more revealed about what not to do than recipes for 
good feminist research. Stanley and Wise devote most of 
the book to e x p l a i n i n g their total revolt against posit ivism 
and determinism; a heavier emphasis, perhaps, than was 
needed. T h e i r protracted paradigm-smashing was felt to 
be necessary, I suspect, because of the in t imidat ing force of 
conventional structuralist assumptions about social real-
ity . In this regard the authors note, " M a n y women appear 
to be very wary of standing u p to Marxist-feminist heavies 
w h o i n a l l circumstances appear to remain absolutely 
convinced of the rightness of what they say" (p. 107). 
Breaking Out attempts to show us how we can make 
sense of our lives and our m i l i e u as i n d i v i d u a l women. 
Yet, we are st i l l left w i t h the problem of structure, even if it 
is people w h o oppress people, structures do exist i n con-
sensual reality and at least at the macro- or policy-level 
must be dealt w i t h i n their o w n terms. T o pursue the 
liberation of women, we must work together for changes 
i n social policy; but, above a l l we need to strive for the k i n d 
of personal insight w h i c h w i l l guide us to improve our 
private lives. 
Cerise Morr is 
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Feminist Literary Studies: A n Introduction. K . K . Ruthven. 
Cambridge University Press, 1984.. 
If n o t h i n g else, K . K . R u t h v e n has done a commendable 
j o b o f ant ic ipat ing objections tohis work. Indeed, most of 
the positions from w h i c h one might choose to respond to 
this survey of feminist literary cr i t ic ism seem already to be 
occupied by the various straw women of the author's 
imaginat ion . One may quest ion the motives that i m p e l a 
male academic to analyse the feminist project, but only at 
the risk of j o i n i n g the nameless "vulgar ians" (p. 9) and 
"vig i lantes" (p. 93) w h o make their appearances i n this 
book. One may object to the harshness and lack of discrim-
ina t ion that c l o u d many of his appraisals of standard 
feminist arguments, but o n l y at the expense of being 
identif ied w i t h the practitioners of "feminist terrorism," 
an extraordinary company w h i c h enjoys "the vicarious 
satisfactions of retaliation and reprisal i n the war of the 
sexes for w h i c h the on ly end is uncondi t iona l surrender of 
a l l power to w o m e n " (p. 10). One may assent, of course, to 
some of his judgements, but, thanks to the int imidatory 
rhetoric of radical feminism, even this opt ion is open only 
to those brave enough to risk association w i t h a contempt-
ible figure branded as the "patr iarchal ly brainwashed trai-
tor to her o w n sex" (p. 14). W h o m is Ruthven w r i t i n g for, 
one wonders. 
G i v e n his obvious contempt for feminist readers, it is 
w i t h particular trepidation that I confess that, unt i l 
Ruthven raised the issue, I had never been greatly alarmed 
at the prospect of a man's w r i t i n g or comment ing on 
feminist cr i t ic ism. T h e proposi t ion that only women can 
speak o n matters that concern women strikes me, as it does 
Ruthven, as both a betrayal of the precept that feminism 
concerns everyone and a replicat ion of the most objection-
able feature of prefeminist exclusionism. Ruthven is quite 
right to point out that if, as many feminists have argued, 
a l l those characteristics associated w i t h female thought 
and expression are acquired and not innate, it is unjustif i -
able to declare a priori that gender alone should disqualify 
anyone from t h i n k i n g or expressing anything. H a d he 
pushed the argument a stage further, moreover, he w o u l d 
surely have seen that the hypothetical protest he is so 
anxious to discredit is self-contradictory as w e l l . That is to 
say, for a w o m a n to m a i n t a i n that a man, s imply because 
he is a man, can know n o t h i n g about femaleness is to 
presume that she herself knows enough about maleness to 
see that his ignorance is hopeless. T h i s confirms precisely 
the possibil i ty of a knowledge of the other sex that this 
imaginary objector to Ruthven's c l a i m is attempting to 
deny. Instead of seizing o n what seems to me a conclusive 
demonstration of his right to p u b l i s h his opinions , 
Ruthven harangues his readers w i t h a series of c i rcum-
